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ON THE BALANCE OF A SET OF RANKS
1 . In tro d u ctio n .
The purpose o f th is  paper i s  to  develop  a theory o f  the balance o f  
a s e t  o f  ranks. A theory o f  rank balance i s  concerned w ith  s itu a t io n s  
in  which a c to r s ,  s ta tu s e s ,  or c o l le c t iv e s  are ranked in  se v e r a l d if fe r e n t  
ways which can be regarded as in c o n s is t e n t ־ Some examples are: the 
Negro p r o fe s s io n a l,  the w ealthy Jew, the im poverished Boston Brahmin, 
the $5,000 a year Harvard Ph»D. I t  i s  w id ely  supposed th at d iscrep a n c ies  
o f  th is  kind are a source o f  s t r a in  and th a t in d iv id u a ls  w i l l  attem pt to  
bring  th e ir  various ranks in to  l i n e ,
1 ,1 ־ Homans6 Ledger C lerk s .
An i l lu s t r a t io n  o f  th is  process i s  reported  by Homans (1953, 1957, 
1961) . The s ta tu s e s  " ledger c lerk"  and "cash poster"  in  the b i l l in g  
o f f ic e  o f  a p u b lic  u t i l i t y  are eva luated  by such c r i t e r ia  as s k i l l ,  r e ­
s p o n s ib i l i t y ,  v a r ie ty ,  income, autonomy, and s e n io r ity »  The ledger c le r k  
i s  regarded by a l l  c lerk s  in  the o f f ic e  as more s k i l l e d ,  more r e sp o n s ib le ,  
more s e n io r , more autonomous, and in v o lv in g  more v a r ie ty  than cash p o s te r .  
For various h is t o r ic a l  reasons the two job s are equal in  income„ That 
the ledger c le r k s  are upset by th is  i s  shown in  th e ir  com plaints to  th e ir  
union , a g ita t in g  for in creased  w ages, and in  th e ir  h o s t i l i t y  to  mangement. 
Cash p o s te r s , furtherm ore, sometimes refu se  what the o f f ic e  regards as  
a "promotion" ra th er than become ledger c le r k ־
The "address f i l e  c lerk "  i s  a th ird  s ta tu s  in  the b i l l i n g  o f f i c e ,
lower than cash p oster  on a l l  c r i t e r ia  by which s ta tu s e s  in  the o f f ic e  
are ranked. Because they are a t  the bottom o f  the o f f i c e  h ierarch y  the 
address f i l e  c le r k s  are not s a t i s f i e d  w ith  th e ir  jo b s , but they do not 
f e e l  u n ju stly  trea ted  and are not as h o s t i l e  towards management as the  
ledger c le r k s .
1 *2 • L en sk i's  c r y s t a l l iz a t io n  problem.
A second i l lu s t r a t io n  i s  reported  by Leneki (1954, 1955). A sample 
o f respondents in  D etro it  i s  ordered w ith  re sp ec t to  occu p ation a l p r e s t ig e ,  
income, ed u ca tio n , and e t h n ic i t y .  An index o f  d iscrep a n c ie s  among these  
ranks i s  computed. Among respondents o f  approxim ately the same average 
socio-econom ic l e v e l ,  those w ith  the g r e a te s t  d iscrep a n c ie s  are the most 
" lib era l"  in  socio-econom ic a t t i t u d e s ,  the most l ik e ly  to  vo te  D em ocratic, 
the le a s t  l ik e ly  to  be s o c ia b le ״ and the most l ik e ly  to  p a r t ic ip a te  in  
community a s so c ia t io n s  fo r  " u t i l ita r ia n "  purposes (such as " g e ttin g  ahead"). 
Lenski in te r p r e ts  " lib e r a lism ” as a d e s ir e  to  change the s o c ia l  s tr u c tu r e ,  
and low s o c ia b i l i t y  as w ithdrawal from u p se ttin g  s i t u a t io n s .  The respondents 
w ith  no d iscrep a n c ies  in  rank are c a l le d  " c r y s ta ll iz e d " ־
1 3 ־ . D e f in it io n  o f  Problem.
In gen era l such s itu a t io n s  have the fo llo w in g  c h a r a c te r is t ic s :
1) A cto rs , s ta tu s e s ,  c o l l e c t i v e s ,  or o th er elem ents o f  a s o c ia l  
system  S may be ordered in  k d i s t in c t  ways according to  c r i t e r ia
V v*°v
־2■
2) Standing on a c r i t e r io n  r ,  i s  an eva lu ated  c h a r a c te r is t ic  in  
S . This means th a t members o f  S, are d i f f e r e n t i a l ly  eva luated  
in  d ir e c t  proportion  to. th e ir  rank on r^ , and p o sse ss io n  o f  
p o s it iv e ly  eva lu ated  stand ing on jr. i s  seen to  be d es ira b le  
in  S . 1
3) A member o f who i s  ordered in  the same way w ith  re sp ec t to  
each o f  h is  k rankings i s  sa id  to  be balanced; otherw ise im- 
b alan ced ״
One i s  in te r e s te d  in  the behavior o f  a c to r s  w ith  imbalanced ranks 
and o f s o c ia l  system s co n ta in in g  such a c to r s .
Various synonyms fo r  balance are ,,congruence", " c r y s ta l l iz a t io n ” , 
" con sisten cy" , any o f  which may be p refix ed  by e i th e r  " sta tu s" , in  the  
sc a la r  s e n se , or "rank". A synonym fo r  " restor in g  balance" i s " e q u i l i -  
bration"  o f  ranks. I n te r e s t  in  rank balance goes back a t  le a s t  to  Weber 
( s e e ,  for  exam ple, Gerth and M i l ls ,  1946, ch . v i i ) . A fundamental paper 
on the su b jec t by Benoit-Sm ullyan appeared in  1944 and s in ce  th a t time 
a number o f in v e s t ig a t io n s  have been reported  in  which d iscrep a n c ies  in  
ranks have been link ed  to observab le p rocesses ranging from p o l i t i c a l  
extremism (o f  both the r ig h t (L ip se t , 19 ) and l e f t  (Barber, 19 ) )  
to  psychosom atic symptoms (Jackson, 1962).
D espite a long h is to r y  o f  g rea t in t e r e s t  in  the problem the a v a ila b le  
evidence on ly  weakly confirm s the c e n tr a l assum ption th a t imbalanced ranks 
generate s t r a in  and e f f o r t s  to  re s to re  balance» C ontradictory r e s u lt s  
have been o b ta in ed , supposedly p o s it iv e  r e s u lt s  are sometimes q u ite  in ­
c o n c lu s iv e , and i t  i s  o fte n  n ecessary  to  in v en t ad hoc p r in c ip le s  to  ex ­
p la in  p ecu lia r  r e s u lt s  in  p a r tic u la r  cases«  This i s  due le s s  to  the fa c t  
th a t the balance assum ption i s  f a l s e ,  than to  the incom plete and very
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vague form ulation  o f  the th eo ry ־ I t s  assum ptions have not been made 
e x p l i c i t ,  the scope o f  the theory has not been c le a r ly  d e fin e d , sev era l  
d is t in c t  p ro cesses  have been going under the same name3 and many p ortion s  
o f  the th eory־ ־ such as the p o ss ib le  response p ro cesses--h a v e  not been  
thought out a t  a l l .
In the presen t paper what i s  accom plished i s  on ly  a p a r t ia l  formu­
la t io n  o f  a theory in  p ro g ress . We do not even try  to  e x p la in  every th in g  
th at has gone under the name o f  rank b a la n ce , but even w ith in  the scope 
o f  what we do in tend  to  e x p la in , the theory i s  not complete« The theory  
i s  narrowly confined  in  scope to  e v a lu a t io n s . I f  the form ulation  we sug­
g e s t  i s  c o r r e c t , response to  imbalanced e v a lu a tio n s  depends on a comparison 
p ro cess . But comparison p rocesses are not y e t  thoroughly understood.
There are a ls o  e v id e n tly  more observab le response p rocesses  than have 
u su a lly  been mentioned in  " testin g "  the th eo ry , but we cannot y e t  tr e a t  
them e x h a u s tiv e ly . I f  we are asked to  j u s t i f y  such a p a r t ia l  form ulation , 
i t s  p r in c ip a l advantage i s  that i t s  gaps p o in t to  the major unsolved prob­
lems o f  the theory more c le a r ly  than no form ulation  a t  a l l .  I t  i s  th e r e ­
fore a more u se fu l guide to  fu rth er  work.
2• The S t r a t i f ic a t io n  o f  S .
The s t r a t i f i c a t io n  o f  a s o c ia l  system  S can be thought o f  in  the 
fo llo w in g  way: the elem ents o f  Í5 (u^, fo r  u n its )  each have some general
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standing or o v e r a ll  ev a lu a tio n  in  S (denoted R .) which i s  determined by— “ i
some s e t  o f  c r i t e r ia  (r^ , r? , . . . .  ) . S ince the c r i t e r ia  may vary in  
im portance, a s e t  o f  w eigh ts (w ^  ־ * • • determ ines how much each  
c r it e r io n  co n tr ib u tes  to  the va lu e o f  R_. . J u st  how the w eighted va lu es  
are added up i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  sa y ,  but c e r ta in ly  i s  a m onotonically  in ­
crea sin g  fu n ctio n  o f  them. For s im p lic ity  assume th a t R^  i s  in  fa c t  a 
lin e a r  fu n ction  o f  . .  . For any g iven  u. we have:
2 •I* A ssum ption. SLi Eq  + ~2״־i 2 + *־ ' + ~k%k ** ~L
There w i l l  be an ex p ress io n  l ik e  2 .1  fo r  each elem ent in  and the 
whole s e t  o f such ex p ressio n s d escr ib es  the system  o f s t r a t i f i c a t io n  o f  
¡3 as a w hole.
Assumption 2 .1  says on ly  th at o v e r a ll  stand ing i s  determ ined by 
adding w eighted stand ings on various c r i t e r ia  re lev a n t in  S . What i s  im­
portant about i t  i s  not the lin e a r  assum ption, which we do not even b e lie v e ,  
but the fa c t  that i t  d e f in e s  «hat i s  r e lev a n t and what i s  n o t . I f  stand­
ing on a g iven  c r i t e r io n  makes no d iffe r e n c e  to  o v e r a ll  stand ing in  S i t  
i s  not an e v a lu a tio n , or rank, in  S .
2 .2 .  D e f in it io n . A rank i s  any value on any c r ite r io n » w ith  non­
zero w eight in  £  or any fu n ction  o f  a com bination o f such 
v a lu e s .
In order to  apply the theory form ulated here one must know, as a
-5■
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r e s u lt  o f  ob servation s o f  S { what the re lev a n t e v a lu a tio n s  are» E valuations  
which are the on ly  in te r p r e ta t io n  o f r^ g iven  in  t h is  paper, ob v iou sly  
change from cu ltu re  to cu ltu re  so  th at some ranks n!ay e x i s t  in  one s o c ia l  
system  th a t do not e x i s t  in  another system¡, and the r e la t iv e  importance 
o f  any rank depends on the standards o f  p a r tic u la r  c u lt u r e s . C learly
a l s o ,  from 2 ,2  i t  fo llo w s  th a t the theory does n ot d escr ib e  behavior o f
X
any elem ent ranked by c r i t e r ia  not s ig n if ic a n t  to  members o f  S .
EXAMPLE 2 .1 :  Suppose the p r e s t ig e  o f  an a c to r  in  a cotrsnimity to  be 
determined e n t ir e ly  by occupation  and e t h n ic i t y ,  w ith  occupation  
tw ice as im portant a s  e t h n ic i t y .  For convenience th ink  o f w eigh ts  
as adding to  1 ־Q0, so  th at w1 (occu p ation ) 667. ־  and w? ( e th n ic i ty )  = 
.333« John Doe i s  a Jew ish doctor who has more 5<? stamps in  h is  
house than any other member o f  the cotraaunity. To make stand ings on 
d if f e r e n t  c r i t e r ia  eoromensurabie transform  them to  p e r c e n t ile  scores»  
John Doe i s  in  the 98th p e r c e n t ile  o f  occu p ation a l p r e s t ig e  scores  
in  S , the 10th p e r c e n t ile  o f  e t h n ic i t y  s c o r e s ,  and 100th p e r c e n t ile  
for  the number o f  5c stamps he owfis. H is o v e r a ll  stand ing i s
69 .8 ־־ (100) (00־ 0) + (10) (333) ־ + (98) (667) ־
The d e sc r ip t io n  o f  the s t r a t i f i c a t io n  o f  S as a whole can be con­
v e n ie n t ly  arranged so  th a t there are th ree d i s t in c t  arrays: 1) a m atrix  
o f  the va lu es  o f  each elem ent on each c r i t e r io n ;  2) a v ecto r  o f  the w eigh ts
3) a v ecto r  o f  the v a lu es  o f  R .. M atrix methods are not employed in  the
" ׳I
presen t theory and the m atrix rep resen ta tio n  i s  alm ost e n t ir e ly  for  v is u a l  
pu rp oses־ In p a r t ic u la r , in  the p resen t s ta te  o f  the a r t  o f  measurement
1 Because o f  t h is  in te r p r e ta t io n  such phenomena as power, p rop erty , 
money, a u th o r ity , in f lu e n c e , and so on , are w ith in  i t s  scope on ly  to  the
degree that they are bases o f  ev a lu a tio n  in  Weber and 3 e n o it ־ Smullyan, 
as w e ll  as o th e r s , b e lie v e d  th a t i f  a stratum  o f  a c to r s  w e© w ealthy they  
ev e n tu a lly  co u ld , u sin g  w ealth  as a reso u rce , acquire power. This i s  
c a l le d  a con version  process« There may w e ll  be such a tendency, and i f  so  
i t  i s  im portant, but i t  i s  not d escrib ed  in  the presen t th eo ry . Nor does 
the presen t theory e i th e r  p re d ic t  or ru le  out the e x is te n c e  o f  "power 
e l i t e s ' 5» Conversion p ro cesses  w i l l  be examined in  a sep arate p u b lic a tio n .
o f  s t r a t i f i c a t io n  the numbers used in  i l lu s t r a t io n s  are a r b itr a r y . With 
such q u a lif ic a t io n s  in  mind we car* v is u a liz e  o v e r a ll  stand ings in  S as  
a product o f  the m atrix o f  v a lu es  o f each elem ent on each c r i t e r io n  p o s t­
m u ltip lie d  by the v ecto r  o f  w e ig h ts .
EXAMPLE 2 ,2 :  Two other a c to r s  in  John Doe’s community are M ichael 
Jones and Edward Sm ith, an Anglo-Saxon garage mechanic and Negro 
lawyer r e s p e c t iv e ly .  The s t r a t i f i c a t io n  o f  S a s  a whole i s  an 
array o f  a l l  i t s  a c to r s '  e v a lu a t io n s , in c lu d in g  Jcnes and Sm ith, 
which would look som ething l ik e :
O ccupational Ethnic O verall
rank rank W eights E valuations
John Doe ~98 10 .99
6 © Occupation .667 ־
M ichael
6 A o>
Jones 30 98 X »*־3»•MS* .53
& & E th n ic ity .333 <•
o a
4
Edward
Smith 95 01 .63
« I «
O è •
Somewhat e l i p t i c a l l y ,  we w i l l  r e fe r  to  the f i r s t  m atrix  a s  the
s t r a t i f i c a t io n  m atrix o f  S , denoted S*.
3 « The Balance o f  a s e t  o f  ranks.
B alance, c o n s is te n c y , congruence, c r y s t a l l i z a t io n ,  or any s im ila r  
conception  means roughly that a s e t  o f  ranks o f  the same elem ent are 
" a ll  in  l in e ."  In order to  avoid  d i f f i c u l t  problems o f  measuring d is ta n ces  
between p o in ts  on a g iv en  dim ension o f  rank, or in  making d is t in c e s  in  
some way commensurable in  comparing d im ensions, we w i l l  th ink  o f  a tra n s-  
form ation o f  S_* in  which on ly  o rd in a l p o s it io n  i s  shown. In th a t case
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the idea o f  balance or co n s is ten cy  i s  sim ply the " lik e  order" o f  the va lu es
for a g iven  elem ent o f  S , The l ik e  order o f  the e n tr ie s  o f  S* means th at
every  en try  in  a g iven  row i s  g rea ter  than , the same a s ,  or le s s  than every
elem ent in  another row w ith  which i t  i s  compared.
3 .1 . D e f in it io n . Ranks in  the i t h  row o f  S* are balanced i f  and 
on ly  i f  every  en try  in  the i t h  row i s  g rea ter  than , the same 
a s ,  or le s s  than each corresponding en try  in  any o th er  row„
EXAMPLE 3 .1 :  Suppose th a t John Doe, M ichael J o n es , and Edward 
Smith were the on ly  a c to r s  in  S . The m atrix  S* in  example 2 .2  
could be transform ed a s  fo llo w s:
Occupation E th n ic ity
1 2
2 3
3 1
Doe 
S* = Smith 
Jones
No row o f  the m atrix i s  b a lanced . Had the f i r s t  row been 1 , 1 , the 
second 2 , 2 , and the th ir d  3 , 3 ,  each row would have been balanced .
3 2 ־. D e f in it io n . The s t r a t i f i c a t io n  m atrix S* i s  balanced i f  and 
on ly  i f  every row in  i t  i s  b a lan ced .
The fundamental assum ptions made in  v ir t u a l ly  a l l  v e r s io n s  o f  the
theory o f  rank balance are th at imbalanced ranks are unstab le and th a t
they generate te n s io n . I t  i s  because th ese  assum ptions are ty p ic a l o f
"balance" th e o r ie s  more g en era lly  th a t we have a lte r e d  the term inology
in  th is  f i e l d  by adding y e t  another la b e l (C f. B erger, Cohen, S n e l l ,  and
Z e ld itc h , 1962; H eid er, 1944, 1946, and 195G).
3 .3 . Assum ption. Balanced ranks are s t a b le .
A ssum ption. Imbalanced ranks tend to  change u n t i l  they become 
balanced .
3 .5 . Assum ption. Imbalanced ranks produce a s ta te  o f  t e n s io n ־
A balance theory or ranks does not say th a t a l l  or most or even any 
imbalanced rank system  ev e n tu a lly  w i l l  be balanced» In em p ir ica l s o c ia l  
system s other s o c ia l  fa c to r s  may combine to  prevent balance from o ccu rr in g ־ 
The theory does sa y , however, that in  such ca ses  ten s io n  w i l l  r e s u l t .  As 
a consequence o f  3«5 a system  in  which change o f  imbalanced ranks i s  
blocked b u ild s  up ten sio n  and the p rocess o f  change, where i t  o ccu rs , i s  
accompanied by ten s io n  u n t i l  change i s  com p lete־ The a c tu a l form o f  the 
ten sio n  v a r ie s  a grea t d e a l־ I t  can be d escrib ed  phenom enologically  as 
a fe e l in g  o f  " in ju s t ic e " , or " g u ilt" , or "embarassment", or "resentm ent"־ 
Anger and h o s t i l i t y  o fte n  co lo r  these em otions. Sometimes the a sso c ia te d  
em otions are d ir e c ted , in  the sen se th a t th e ir  ta r g e t  i s  some s ta te  o f  
a f f a ir s  th a t i s  seen to  be resp o n sib le  for imbalance» Sometimes they are 
free  f lo a t in g  and become d isp la ced  in  sca p e-g ca t re a c tio n s  or p o ss ib ly  
even psychosom atic symptoms. Very l i t t l e  i s  known about the co n d itio n s  
under which th ese  d if f e r e n t  kinds o f  em otions occur or how they a f f e c t  
b eh av ior־ (For an e x c e l le n t  d isc u ss io n  o f resentm ent see  S c h e le r , 196 1 )־ 
The p a r tic u la r  ways in  which change i s  brought about a ls o  vary a great  
d e a l.
4* Two Boundary C o n d itio n s .
To s im p lify  development o f  the theory we make the fo H a v in g  two
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assum ptions, w ithout which noth ing in  the p resen t form ulation would be
true:
4■•!• Assum ption. Members o f  S agree on the w eigh ts to  be g iven  
c r i t e r ia  by which they ev a lu a te  them selves and others»
4 .2 . Assum ption. A member o f  S has an o v e r a ll  e v a lu a tio n  o f  h im se lf  
th at i s  not l e s s  p o s it iv e  than the ev a lu a tio n s  o th ers have o f  
him.
The import o f  the f i r s t  assum ption i s  o b v iou s. The p o in t o f  the 
second i s  th a t a person might not f e e l  d istu rb ed  a t  r e c e iv in g , l e t  us sa y , 
much le s s  pay than h is  occu p ation a l p r e s t ig e  e n t i t l e s  him to  i f  he has 
a very low op in ion  o f h im s e lf .  He might regard i t  as j u s t  th a t o th ers  
tr e a t  him in  a way th a t norm ally would be regarded as u n ju st .
Both boundary co n d itio n s  would be re laxed  in  a more comprehensive 
development o f  the theory o f  rank b a la n ce , and vie regard both as temporary. 
A completed theory would con sid er what consequences could be expected  in  
a system  th a t was irnbalanced but had no consensus about the r e la t iv e  im­
portance o f  ranks 3 or what response to  imbalance could be expected  from 
a c to rs  who deprecated them selves even more than did o th e r s .
5 ־ The comparison p r o c e ss .
I f  Robinson Crusoe had been a garage mechanic making $40,000 a year 
would he have known th a t he was being  overpaid? I f  he had been paid  
$1,000 would he have known he was underpaid? S a t is fa c t io n  w ith  a g iven
rank i s  a r e la t iv e  s a t is f a c t io n  (or d ep r iv a tio n ) e s ta b lis h e d  by comparison  
w ith  o th ers l ik e  o n e s e lf  (Durkheim, 18 ) .  But i f  th at i s  so , then i t  
i s  p o ss ib le  that no rank b alancing  p rocess i s  a c t iv a te d  because i t  i s  
p o ss ib le  th at an a c to r  does not compare h im se lf  to  o th e r s . We s h a l l  r e fe r  
to  th is  as vacuous b a la n ce .
5 .1 . D e f in it io n . A row in  S* i s  vacuously  balanced i f  i t  i s  compared 
w ith  no other row in  S*.
We then have the very fundamental r e s u lt  th a t ,
5 .2 .  Vacuously balanced ranks are s ta b le .
I f  a row i 3 not compared w ith any other row in  S* there i s  no way to  s a t i f  fy  
d e f in it io n  3 .1 ,  so t h a t  even though i t  seems a t r i v i a l  sense o f  the term 
the e v a lu a tio n s  are ba lanced . And in  th a t case they  are not l ik e ly  to  
change.
I s  comparison then s u f f i c ie n t  to  a c t iv a te  a balance process? I t  i s
ev id en t th at i t  i s  n o t, s in ce  a com parison, even by someone who i s  not
balanced from an o u tsid e  o b serv er 's  p o in t o f  v iew , might p o ss ib ly  be w ith
another elem ent imbalanced in  p r e c is e ly  the same way.
EXAMPLE 5 .1 . A c o l le g e  p ro fessor  in  a sm all mid-Western c o l le g e  makes 
$5,000 a y ea r . Most o f  the time he compares h im se lf  on ly  w ith  other  
p ro fesso rs  a t  the same s c h o o l. He w i l l  not d isco v er  any d iscrep a n c ies  
in  h is  ranks u n le ss  they occur w ith in  th at sc h o o l.
In su la t io n  s itu a t io n s  o f  th is  kind are probably f a ir ly  common.
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5 3 ־. D e f in it io n . I f  a su b set o f  rows i n ¿ *  can be arranged to
form a new m atrix  Q* such th a t a l l  rows in  Q* are balanced , 
then Q* i s  a b a lan ced subsystem  o f  whether or not S* 
i t s e l f  i s  b a lan ced ״
I t  should be obvious th a t ,
5»4. I f  Q* i s  a balanced subsystem  o f  S* and elem ents o f  Q*
are compared on ly  w ith  other elem ents o f  Q*, the ranks in  
Q* are s t a b le ־
Furthermore,
5«5. I f  an imbalanced m atrix S* i s  p a r tit io n e d  in to  subm atrices 
a l l  o f  which ara balanced subsystem s and a l l  o f  which are 
in s u la te d , the imbalanced m atrix S.* i s  s t a b l e ־
In order to  a c t iv a te  a b alancing  p r o c e ss , in  o ther w ords, one must
compare o n e s e lf  w ith  someone e l s e  who i s  not imbalanced in  the same way
a s o n e s e l f ־
But even imbalanced comparisons are not s u f f i c ie n t  to  a c t iv a te  a
b alancing  p ro cess , and in  fa c t  our knowledge o f  the a c t iv a t in g  co n d itio n s
i s  in com p lete־ This i s  because not every  comparison th a t occurs i s
r e la t iv e ly  d ep riv ing  or g u ilt - in d u c in g , the kinds o f  comparisons th a t seem
to  u n d erlie  rank balance p r o c e s se s ,
EXAMPLE 5 ,2 ,  An I ta lia n -b o r n  immigrant who has become r ic h  compares 
h im self w ith  an Anglo-Saxon who i s  r i c h ־ Perhaps he d isco v ers  th a t  
he has been refu sed  adm ission  to  a w e ll-r ep u te d  club o f  which the 
Anglo-Saxon i s  a member־ He may th in k , "Why, i f  I make as much as 
he d oes, d on 't I  g e t trea ted  as i f  I were ju s t  as good?" But suppose 
he compares h im se lf  to  an I t a l ia n  immigrant who has not done so  
w e ll a s h e . Re may th in k , "I'm not doing so b a d ly , compared to  
some I ta l ia n s  l ik e  m y se lf."
The presen t theorjr i s  th ere fo re  indeterm inate uxi'c&l a b e t te r  understanding  
o f  the a c t iv a t in g  co n d itio n s  o f  the process i s  p o s s ib le ־
6» Homans 8 theory o f  in vestm en t, c o s t ,  and p r o f i t «
The indeterm inacy o f  the comparison process i s  to  some ex ten t r e ­
duced in Homans' theory of s o c ia l  j u s t i c e  (1961), Borrowing some con­
cepts from economics, Homans tr e a ts  some ranks a s  in v estm en ts־ A person  
w ith  high ed u cation  has spent tin® and money to g e t  th is  rank־ S e n io r ity  
in an organization can also be seen  as an in vestm en t, s in ce  to g et h igh  
s e n io r ity  a person has p a t ie n t ly  labored in  subordinate p o s it io n s  over 
a long p er io d ־ Souse ranks, l ik e  income and p r e s t ig e ,  are rewards ־
Such a sp ec ts  o f  a p erso n 's  behavior as r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  (tak in g  blame, 
working long hours) are in  Homans' theory c o s t s . Prof i t )  f i n a l l y , can 
be d efin ed  as the d if fe r e n c e  between rewards and c o s t s .
The p r in c ip le  o f  s o c ia l  j u s t i c e  a s s e r t s  th a t:
6 .1 .  A person w i l l  be upset i f  there i s  a lack  o f  p r o p o r tio n a lity  
between h is  investm ents and h is  p r o f i t s .
In order to  fin d  out whether p r o f it s  are p rop ortion a l to  investm ents  
a person must compare h im se lf w ith  other people soa® o f  whom have and some 
o f  whom have not made the investm ents he has made־ I n tu i t iv e ly  i t  seems 
l ik e ly  th a t he w i l l  focus a t te n t io n  on the ranks th a t rep resen t investm ents  
and exp ect p r o f it s  to  match. Thus, comparing h im se lf  w ith  a person o f  
lower education  but the same pay, he i s  l ik e ly  to  sa y , ,׳Why d on 't I get  
b e tte r  paid" ra th er  than , "I am doing rather w e l l ,  because compared to
oth ers w ith  the same pay I  have more ed u cation ."
Starred s e c t io n s  may be om itted w ithout in terr u p tin g  the development 
o f  the th eo ry .
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6 .2  A person is more l ik e ly  to  focus a t te n t io n  in  a comparison 
on those ranks th a t rep resen t investm ents than those th a t do 
n o t.
I f  i t  were not fo r  the fa c t  that sotae ranks are hard to  con ceive o f  
as investm ents or rewards th is  would be a determ inate s o lu t io n .  Homans 
tr e a ts  e th n ic i ty  and se x , for in s ta n c e , as investm ents (Homans, 1961, 
p , 236) but th is  seems a rath er dubious s tr e tc h in g  o f  the con cep t.
P o ss ib ly  age can be trea ted  as an in vestm en t, because i t  i s  l ik e ly  to  be 
roughly co rr e la ted  w ith  s e n io r ity  and tr a in in g , which are in vestm en ts .
But Homans' id e a , w h ile  u se fu l in  many c a s e s ,  does not seem to  be a 
gen era l s o lu t io n .
7 , System R eference Problem s,
So fa r  the p o ss ib le  u n its  and system s th a t may be ׳’mixed" in  one 
s t r a t i f i c a t io n  m atrix have been l e f t  w ithout r e s t r i c t io n .  But t h is  perm its 
some rather n o n sen sica l statem ents which we would l ik e  to  ru le  out o f  the 
th eo ry ,
EXAMPLE 7 ,1 .  The ranks d o cto r , fa th er  are compared w ith  the ranks 
ca rp en ter , fa th e r ־ The f i r s t  a c to r  i s  h igher than the second on 
occu p ation a l rank, but the same on h is  "fam ily" rank־
EXAMPLE 7 ,2 .  The ranks p r ie s t ,  C ath o lic  are compared w ith  the ranks 
b ish op , C a th o lic ־ The f i r s t  a c to r  i s  lower than the second on 
rank w ith in  the church, but the same on h is  other rank.
I t  i s  n ot reasonable to  argue th a t fa th er  and C ath o lic  are not ranks,
s in c e  w ith in  some system s o f  referen ce  they a r e ־ But i t  i s  reasonable  
to  argue that¿ a t  le a s t  som etim es, s h i f t in g  le v e ls  o f  re feren ce  change
the meaning o f a com parison. This w i l l  occur p a r t ic u la r ly  when a rank
th at d if f e r e n t ia t e s  meabers o f  a system  does not d if f e r e n t ia t e  the members
o f a subsystem , a s  when the Ph.D. doe3 not d if f e r e n t ia t e  a s s is ta n t  pro-
' fe s so r  from p ro fesso r  in  a fa c u lty  most o f  whose members have the d eg ree .
That con fu sion  over s h i f t in g  system  referen ces  i s  not more common
2i s  p a r tly  due to  the fa c t  th a t ranks in  fa c t  s h i f t  rath er r e a d ily .
EXAMPLE 7 .3 . The fa c to ry  s i s  in  the community S , w ith in  which 
e th n ic  subgroups, x , v ,  and z l i v e .  O ccupational le v e ls  manager, 
su p erv iso r , worker may be d i f f e r e n t ia l ly  eva luated  in  3 by such 
c r i t e r ia  as r e la t iv e  importance to  p rod u ction , r e la t iv e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y ,  
r e la t iv e  knowledge. E thnic groups may be eva lu ated  w ith in  S by such 
c r i t e r ia  a s  degree o f  a s s im ila t io n ,  how r e c e n tly  im m igrated, average 
ed u ca tio n . W ithin £  one b a s is  on which a c to r s  are eva luated  and 
a llo c a te d  to  occu p ation a l le v e ls  i s  th e ir  e th n ic  rank in  S (C o ll in s ,  
1946).
EXAMPLE 7 .4 ,  The mining company £  in  the community S co n ta in s  some 
workers who are o f f i c i a l s  in  the union u and some who are important 
in  community p o l i t i c s .  S u p erv iso rs , mining e n g in e e r s , and 
workers in  the company tr e a t  workers who are o f f i c i a l s  or p o l i t i c ia n s  
w ith  more resp ec t than they do other workers (Observed by Anderson 
during f i e ld  work in  a Swedish community)־
To ru le  out n o n sen sica l comparisons i t  i s  s u f f i c ie n t  to  requ ire th at  
the s t r a t i f i c a t io n  m atrix S* rep resen t one le v e l  o f  system  on ly ; or
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\ ^  The rea d in ess  w ith  which bases o f  e v a lu a tio n  s h i f t  about p a r tly  
accounts for  the high degree o f  co n s is ten cy  in  ranks freq u en tly  observed  
(Landecker, 1961). I f  income i s  a b a s is  o f  ev a lu a tin g  occu p ation a l 
p r e s t ig e ,  and i f  in cr ea sin g  w ealth  i s  a b a s is  o f  in c r e a sin g  p r e s t ig e  
o f  an e th n ic  group, and f in a l ly  i f  occu p ation , income, and e th n ic i ty  
are b ases o f  e v a lu a tin g  an a c to r ’s "community stand ing" , i t  i s  not 
su rp r is in g  th a t h is  various ranks to  some degree c o r r e la te .
/־■
e q u iv a le n tly  that i t s  u n its  a l l  be o f  one le v e l»  Because th is  sounds
/ ־ ׳"
rather r e s t r i c t iv e ,  in  view o f the in te r p e n e tr a tio n  th at i s  c h a r a c te r is t ic  
o f  rankss i t  i s  desirable:: to  show th at the ru le  i s  in  fa c t  f a ir ly  f l e x i b l e .  
I t  can a ls o  be shown that the ru le  i s  on ly  an a p p lic a t io n  o f  assum ption
2 .1 .  There are three cases o f  in t e r e s t :
Case 1.  C r ite r ia  in  one system  are a ls o  c r i t e r ia  in  another system  
or a t  another l e v e l .
In th is  case no problems a r i s e .  So long as the c r i t e r io n  i s  a 
determ inant o f  e v a lu a tio n s  in  e i th e r  system  a t e ith e r  l e v e l ,  assum ption
2 .1  i s  s a t is f ie d „  No p a r tic u la r  ru le  i s  n ecessa ry .
Case 2 . C r ite r ia  a t  one le v e l  o f system  are not c r i t e r ia  a t
another l e v e l ,  but o v e r a l l  ev a lu a tio n s  a t  the one le v e l  
are c r i t e r ia  a t  the o th e r . EXAMPLE: Occupations may be 
ranked in  part for the way in  w hich, in  a g iven  system  such 
as the fa c to ry  £ ,  th e ir  r e la t iv e  co n tr ib u tio n  to  t o ta l  
output i s  eva lu a ted ; a c to rs  in  the community may be evaluated  
in  part for th e ir  o ccu p a tio n s.
In the second c a s e ,  in  order to  s a t i s f y  assum ption 2 .1  the o v e r a ll  
ev a lu a tio n s  a t  le v e l  £  must appear as c r i t e r ia  in  the s t r a t i f i c a t io n  
m atrix a t  le v e l  £  + 1 and th ese  o v e r a ll  ev a lu a tio n s  must a c tu a lly  be 
among the determ inants o f  o v e r a ll  e v a lu a tio n s  a t  le v e l  £  +  1« This i s  
eq u iv a len t to  app ly ing the ru le  o f  one l e v e l .  The ru le  i s  not very r e ­
s t r ic t i v e  s in ce  e v a lu a tio n s  in  one system  are in  fa c t  s h i f t in g  to  the 
o th er .
Case 3 . The c r i t e r io n  r , determ ines e v a lu a tio n s  R. a t  le v e l  £  but 
n e ith e r  r^ nor^I-L are re lev a n t to  o v e r a ll  e v a lu a tio n  a t  
le v e l  s + 1 (o r , fo r  th at m a tter , £  1 ־)«
־16־
I
In the th ird  case i t  i s  not p o ss ib le  to  s a t i s f y  assum ption 2 .1  i f  
le v e ls  are sh ifte d »  I f  assum ption 2«1 i s  not s a t i s f i e d  a t  le a s t  one o f  
the ranks compared i s  not re lev a n t or s ig n if ic a n t»  I f  a t  le a s t  one o f  
the ranks compared i s  not re lev a n t no rank imbalance i s  c r e a te d ״ I f  no 
imbalance i s  created  no q u estio n  o f  s t a b i l i t y  o f  ranks a r ise s»
E xpressing the ru le  in  another way,
7 «,I, A rank from the m atrix £ * , where a i s  a subsystem  or
subgroup o f S , i s  a rank a ls o  in  the m atrix S* i f  and on ly  i f
1 . r . i s  a ls o  among the c r i t e r ia  o f  o v e r a ll  e v a lu a tio n“=1
in  S
2 . or some fu n ctio n  o f  f ( r ^ ) ,  i s  among the c r i t e r ia  
o f  o v e r a ll  ev a lu a tio n  in  S."
But having ru led  out comparisons th a t s h i f t  l e v e l ,  we have not ru led
out every p o ss ib le  absurd comparison» Consider
EXAMPLE 7»4» On a f is h in g  t r ip  w ith  a graduate s tu d en t, a p ro fessor  
d isco v ers  th at he has been outperformed by the s tu d e n t־ He compares 
the ranks p r o fe sso r , novice fly -fish erm a n  w ith  the ranks graduate 
s tu d e n ts exp ert fly -fish erm an «
Our theory apparently  perm its the co n c lu sio n  th a t the p ro fesso r  i s  
d istu rb ed ; in  fa c t  i t  perm its the con c lu sio n  th a t every a c to r  wants to  
be balanced on every  p o ss ib le  b a s is  o f  ev a lu a tio n  whatever the s i tu a t io n .
I f  the number o f  rank-dim ensions in  S i s  very large probably every  acto r  
w i l l  be ״out o f  l i n e ״ on a t  le a s t  one o f  th ese  d isten sio n s» Hence every  
a cto r  would a t  some time or o th er be d istu rb ed .
Thought not a problem o f l e v e l s ,  the u n iv e r s ity  and the f is h in g  tr ip  
are another example o f  s h i f t in g  system s o f  referen ce»  I t  i s  not l ik e ly  
th a t the p ro fesso r  in  example 7»4 i s  much d istu rb ed  because h is  incompetence 
as a fly -fish erm an  does not much th reaten  h is  competence as a p rofessor«
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One does not tran sport ranks from one system  to  another u n less  the bases  
o f e v a lu a tio n  in  the two system s have something in  coirauon־. Hence we have 
the ru le  that
7 .2 .  A mixed m atrix  £* th a t i s  formed o f  some ranks r (e _ ) and some 
ranks r (£ g )j  where s , and gg arc both subsystem s or subgroups 
in  ¡3, i s  a s t r a t i f i c a t io n  m atrix  in  S i f  and on ly  i f  s^* and 
¿ 2* have a t  le a s t  one rank in  ccmmon.
I f  competence as a fly -fish erm a n  in vo lved  some o f the same a b i l i t i e s
as competence as a p ro fesso r  then the two ev a lu a tio n s  would be re lev a n t
to  each other and the system  in  example 7 .4  would be im balanced.
8 . Role D if f e r e n t ia t io n .
Adams (1954) has a p p lied  the rank-balance theory to  a s i tu a t io n  o f
the fo llo w in g  k ind .
EXAMPLE 8 .1 .  An a ir -crew  commander and p i l o t ,  a m ajor, w ith  7 years 
f l i g h t  ex p er ien ce , but not the most popular member o f  h is  crew, i s  
compared w ith  h is  c o - p i lo t ,  a c a p ta in , w ith  4 years f l i g h t  ex p er ien ce , 
who i s  the most popular member o f  h is  crew.
I t  i s  q u estion ab le  th a t such a comparison produces an im balance. I f  
the r o le s  o f  task  leader and ex p ress iv e  leader become d if f e r e n t ia t e d ,  does 
i t  fo llow  from the theory o f  rank balance th a t the group i s  itsbalanced? I f  
such a r e s u lt  were to  fo llo w  from the theory i t s  p r e d ic tio n s  would probably 
o fte n  be wrong*
When r o le s  become d i f f e r e n t ia t e d ,  what happens i s  that a c to rs  do not 
compare the ways in  which th ey , as a c to r s ,  are ev a lu a ted . What they com­
pare i s  the se v e r a l ways in  which th e ir  r o le s  are ev a lu a te d ״
EXAMPLE 8 .2 .  Dr, Smith i s  a surgeon. As an a n a e s th e t is t  he i s  not 
so competent as Dr. Jo n es, a c e r t i f i e d  a n a e s t h e s io lo g is t . During 
surgery i t  i s  Jon es' job to  gas and Sm ith’s job  to  cut« The s ta tu s  
o f  surgeon i s ,  in  the h o s p i ta l ,  regarded as the more r e sp o n s ib le ,  
the more s k i l l e d ,  i t  has more p r e s t ig e ,  i t  has more income»
«2 0־
se v e r a l a c to rs  may r e sto re  balance a t  the same time but not n e c e s sa r ily  
to  the same e f f e c t ,  no m icro-process a lone i s  s u f f i c ie n t  to  res to re  
balance and the m acro-process i s  o fte n  more u n stab le  than would be in ­
ferred  from any s in g le  m icro-process«
9 2 ־ No b a la n ce -re sto r in g  behavior o f  u. i s  s u f f i c ie n t  to  balance S ,~־i  ־־־
EXAMPLE 9«2» Union U i s  an o ld , r e sp e c te d , and h ig h ly  s k i l l e d  c r a f t  union  
w hile union V i s  a new u p s ta r t , m ostly  o f  m oderately s k i l l e d  w orkers, 
the dynamic lead ersh ip  o f  which has obtained  a s u b s ta n t ia l wage in ­
crease th at equals U״s wage le v e l«  A ssign in g  N orth-H att sco res  and 
wages a r b it r a r i ly ,  we have to  begin  w ith :
Ranks
Wage Level 
$4 .50 /h rT
$ 4 «50/h r  »
P r e stig e  
“  67
60
U
V
Unions
There are two m icro״p r o c è s se s , one from U and one from V 's p o in t  
o f  view:
Union V 's m icro-processUnion U 's m icro-process
V has ranks 60 , $4.50  
Members o f  V compare them­
s e lv e s  w ith  U«
Members o f  V f e e l  r e la t iv e ly  
d ep rived , not s u f f i c ie n t ly  
resp ected  
Union V conducts campaign to  
change i t s  p u b lic  image and 
c lo se  p r e s t ig e  d i f f e r e n t ia l  
Union V succeeds in  r a is in g  
p r e s t ig e  to  a score o f  67
Time 0 .  U has ranks 67 , $4«50 
Time 1 . Members o f  U compare them­
s e lv e s  w ith  V.
Time 2 .  Members o f  U f e e l  r e la t iv e ly  
d ep rived , underpaid
Time 3« Union U a g ita t e s  fo r  in crea se  
in  wages to  m aintain  wage 
d i f f e r e n t ia l  
Time 4« Union U succeeds in  in crea sin g  
wages to  $ 5 «00 /h r .
Assuming as we have th a t each succeeds in  r a is in g  i t s  lower rank,
each cou ld  have resto red  balancé had the o ther not a lte r e d  i t s  own 
ranks» But in s te a d , we have
Ranks
P r e st ig e  Wage L evel 
U (~ 67 $5 00־“
Unions
V L  67 $4.50_
which i s  s t i l l  not balanced .
9 .1  and 9 .2  may be c a lle d  spread o f  s ta te  theorem s. A th ird  spread
o f  s ta te  phenomenon i s  the reb u ff p r o c e ss .
EXAMPLE 9 .3 . Giovanni C ic c i ,  a very w ealthy I ta lia n -b o r n  immigrant, 
moves in to  o ld  -Atnerican neighborhood £ ,  puts h is  c h ild  in  p r iv a te  
sc h o o l, a p p lie s  fo r  adm ission to  the country c lu b , and in  other ways 
t r ie s  to  improve h is  s t y le  o f  l i f e  and s ta tu s  honor so  th a t i t  i s  
more in  lin e  w ith  h is  income. But he fin d s  th a t h is  neighbors do 
not v i s i t  much, h is  ch ild r en  do not fin d  very  many fr ien d s  in  the 
nevj sc h o o l, he i s  not adm itted to  the country c lu b , and in  gen era l 
h is  I t a l ia n  o r ig in  i s  not e a s i l y  l e f t  beh ind .
What i s  im portant in  t h is  case i s  th at ego h im se lf would have f e l t  
the imbalance o f  e th n ic  and income ranks very much le s s  or not a t  a l l  i f  
i t  were not fo r  the response o f  a l t e r s .  Probably they are responding not 
only to  C ic c i 's  rank i t 3e l f ,  but a ls o  to  h is  am bition  to  be one o f  them. 
In any case th e ir  response makes apparent what might not have been so  
apparent, th a t h is  e th n ic  rank i s  not so  e a s i l y  brought in to  l i n e .  A l­
though e s s e n t ia l ly  a secondary p r o c e ss , reb u ff can th ere fo re  have an im­
portant bearing on the indeterm inacy d escrib ed  in  s e c t io n  4 .  Where C icc i 
had not f e l t  r e la t iv e  d ep r iv a tio n  b e fo r e , he might now. From the poin t 
o f view o f  a l t e r ,  i t  seems l ik e ly  th a t reb u ff w i l l  occur whenever e g o ’s
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e f f o r t  to  balance ranks causes a l t e r  to  lo se  rank» This might e i th e r
be through con tag ion , where a s s o c ia t in g  w ith  ego means a lo s s  o f  rank
fo r  a l t e r ,  or through d ep rec ia tio n  o f  a rank, as where a lt e r * s  "club",
h is  neighborhood, e t c .  are le so  valued  because o f  th e ir  changing com״
p o s it io n , (see  pagas 3 3 -3 4 ).
10. Observable Response P r o c e s se s .
The le a s t  s a t is fa c to r y  part o f  the theory o f  rank balance i s  i t s
account o f  how balance i s  r e s to r e d . A ll  th a t i t  says so fa r  i s  th a t ,  once
comparison a c t iv a te s  the p r o c e ss , imbalance i s  d is tu rb in g  and an attem pt
w i l l  be made to  r e s to r e  balance; how i s  u n c lea r . The most commonly
mentioned mechanisms are m o b ility  and r e v o lu tio n . In B enoit-Sm ullyan ,
for  exam ple, an a c to r  who i s  imbalanced f i r s t  attem pts to  r a ise  h is  lower
ranks־ I f  b lock ed , he then turns to  r a d ic a l ,  ex tre m ist  p r o te s t  d irec ted
a g a in s t  the rank s tru ctu re  i t s e l f »  What may be c a l le d  a Benoit-Smu11yan
response process i s  i l lu s t r a t e d  in  example 1 0 1 ־.
EXAMPLE 10 .1  In the e a r ly  18th cen tu ry , the French B o u rg eo isie , 
ra p id ly  in crea sin g  in  w ea lth , were ab le  to  buy army coranissions 
and ju d ic ia r y  p o sts  from the crown. They did so where\׳er  they  
could because such s ta tu s e s  were n o b le , a llo w in g  the b o u rgeo isie  
to  convert income in to  s ta tu s  honor. Because th ese  s ta tu s e s  were 
becoming le s s  and le s s  c e r ta in  s ig n s  o f  noble o r ig in ,  and hence 
were d ep rec ia tin g  in  v a lu e , the n o b i l i t y  forced  the crown to  stop  
th e ir  s a le  to  the b ou rgeo isie .T h e b o u rg eo is ie  then became revo lu tion ary  
(Barber, 19 ) .
I f  t h is  were the process a c tu a l ly  to  be ex p ected , the on ly  d i f f i c u l t  
q u estion  would be: what determ ines "block ing”? Even t h is  q u estio n  i s  
not very d i f f i c u l t ,  s in c e  probably the most im portant co n d itio n s  are
*
e ith e r  th a t e g o 's  lower rank i s  a scr ib ed  or th a t e g o ’s m o b ility  causes  
a l t e r  to  decrease in  rank־ But the !natter i s  not n early  s c  s im p le ־
Lenski has shown th at some in c o n s is te n ts  r e tr e a t  in to  i s o la t io n  (195 ) ״ 
F razier has shown th a t some r e tr e a t  in stea d  in to  in s u la t io n  (F r a z ie r , 19 )„  
Even i f  in c o n s is te n ts  do not withdraw they do n ot n e c e s s a r ily  r a is e  th e ir  
lower ranks; for  F en ch el, Monderer, and H artley  (19 ) found some a c to rs  
who lowered th e ir  h igher ranks. Furthermore, some a c to r s  become ra d ic a l  
w ithout w a itin g  for  a l t e r  to  b lock  th e ir  m o b ility . L ip se t has argued 
that u lt r a ״Americanism, as a fa c to r  in  r a d ic a l r ig h t  b eh av ior , i s  e s s e n t ia l ly  
a way o f  cla im ing h igher e th n ic  rank (L ip s e t , 19 ) .  In fa c t  the p o l i t i c s  
o f  rank imbalance have not emerged very  c le a r ly  as y e t .  Sometimes i t  i s  
l e f t  p o lit ic s ,so m e tim e s  r ig h t  p o l i t i c s ,  sometimes a curious blend o f  both  
th a t i s  found (Anderson and Z e ld itc h , 1964)«
That i s o la t io n  or in s u la t io n  are responses to  irabalance fo llo w s from 
the fa c t  th a t i t  i s  comparison th a t a c t iv a te s  the balance p r o c e ss ־ Hence 
r o le - d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  too must be counted a p o ss ib le  resp o n se , s in c e  any 
fa c to r  th a t i s  an a c t iv a t in g  co n d itio n  o f  imbalance i s  a ls o  a p o ss ib le  
response to  i t »  The p o ss ib le  w ithdrawal responses are:
1 0 1 ־. C la s s i f i c a t io n .
1 ״ I s o la t io n  i s  a response to  imbalance in  which y.. i s  com­
pared w ith  no o ther u.. in  S*.
2• In su la tio n  i s  a response to  imbalance in  which u. i s  com­
pared on ly  w ith  those a,, , s in  S* which are not imbalanced 
w ith  $¿^ ־ J
3• R ole־ d if f e r e n t ia t io n  i s  a response to  imbalance in  which 
a c to r s  compare them selves on ly  a t  the le v e l  o f  s ta tu s e s  
which are them selves b a lan ced ־
־23־
The d e f in it io n  o f  in s u la t io n  i s  somewhat d ecep tiv e  because i t  con­
c e a ls  two rather d if f e r e n t  resp o n ses. In one an a c to r  compares h im se lf  
only w ith  other a c to rs  having the same im balance, a s w e ll- to -d o  Negroes 
might withdraw in to  a community in  which they encounter on ly  o ther m iddle- 
c la s s  N egroes. In the o th e r , an a c to r  compares h im se lf  on ly  w ith  other  
a c to rs  among whom one o f  h is  imbalanced ranks i s  not a s ig n if ic a n t  rank, 
as a w e ll- to -d o  Negro might become a member o f  the Negro community as a 
w hole, but avoid  the w hite community. In the la t t e r  case h is  co lo r  i s
3
on ly  a membership c r i t e r io n ;  w ith in  the community i t s e l f  i t  i s  not a rank.
So long as he were granted deference w ith in  the community fo r  h is  w ea lth , 
he would not be im balanced. Probably one would fin d  him to be an Uncle 
Tom le a d e r --a  leader because o f  re sp ec t for h is  w ea lth , an Uncle Tom b e­
cause he would find  th a t any in tr u s io n  in to  the w hite community upset 
h is  b a lan ce .
P a r t ic u la r ly  the la t t e r  type o f  in s u la t io n  d eserves c a r e fu l in v e s t i ­
g a tio n , but as a m atter o f  fa c t  no w ithdrawal mechanism has been s u f f i c ie n t ly  
in v e s t ig a te d  to  be ab le to  say what co n d itio n s  determ ine them« For the 
moment, though we cannot say why, suppose th a t none o f  them occur: how 
w i l l  an a c to r  try  to  balance h is  ranks then? Very probably an attem pt to  
change h is  in d iv id u a l ranks i s  more l ik e ly  than an e f f o r t  to  change the 
whole rank s tru ctu re  o f  S , but i s  i t  tr u e , a s commonly supposed, that he
3
This ign ores the fa c t  th at co lo r  d if fe r e n c e s  are in  fa c t  ranks 
w ith in  the Negro community, s in ce  the p o in t i s  not much a f fe c te d  by t h is  f a c t .
־2 4־
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w i l l  f i r s t  try  to  r a ise  h is  low est ranks? Or i s  the fo llo w in g  example 
not p la u sib le?
EXAMPLE 102־. Through some p e c u lia r  fluke o f  p a st h is to r y ,  A ss is ta n t  
P rofessor Sm ith, o f  u n iv e r s ity  U, has been g iven  a p r iv a te  o f f i c e .
U manages to  h ire  J o n es , a very d is t in g u ish e d  f u l l  p ro fesso r  in  
the same f i e l d  as Smith* B ut, l ik e  many u n iv e r s i t i e s ,  U has a space 
problem and cannot find  p r iv a te  o f f ic e  space for  Jones« Smith very  
generously  g iv e s  up h is  o f f i c e  to  Jones and moves in. w ith  two other  
ju n io r  c o lle a g u e s .
I t  cannot be supposed th a t u n iv e r s i t ie s  are le s s  l ik e ly  than other
o rg a n iza tio n s to  in v e s t  ru g s, o f f i c e s ,  d esk s , and so  on, w ith  rank» What
has happened, in s te a d , i s  th a t the o f f ic e  can be looked on more as a
symbol or cue o f  another rank, ra th er than as an independent rank in  i t ״
s e l f ״ When there i s  a q u estio n  o f  b r in g in g  a rank and i t s  symbol in to
l i n e ,  i t  i s  e a s ie r  to  see the symbol as changing than the rank i t  sym b olizes.
Probably th is  can be g en era lized  to  any s itu a t io n  in  which a c to rs  in  £
see a cau sa l r e la t io n  between two ranks—as they m ight, fo r  exam ple, in
the case o f  a b i l i t y  and rew ards״
10»2, D e f in it io n . Let i t  be supposed in  ¡3 th a t r . i s  the cause o f  
r . ־ Then r  and r . are con tin gen t ranks, and r . i s  the inde 
pendent w h ile  r . ii> the dependent rank,
Our b a s ic  assum ptions are:
10 .3 . Assum ption. I f  r . and r . are noncontingent imbalanced ranks, 
w hichever rank i s  lower־' i s  r a is e d .
1 0 .4 . Assum ption. I f  r and r are con tin g en t imbalanced ranks, 
w hichever rank i s  dependent i s  changed in  the d ir e c t io n  o f  
b a la n ce ,
־2 6־
But the q u estion  th a t was asked was: what w i l l  an "actor" do? as  
i f  on ly  a c to rs  were m obile» Any elem ent o f  S could  be m ob ile , not on ly  
a c to r s ,  and i t  makes some d iffe r e n c e  what elem ent i s  m eant» We may de­
f in e  m o b ility  in  gen era l to  mean:
1 0 .5 . D e f in it io n . M o b ility  i s  the in crea se  or decrease o f  some 
rank r . by a ivy elem ent u. in  S .
“ TL V t .  —
For la te r  u se , we in troduce the c l a s s i f i c a t io n
1 0 .6 . C la s s i f i c a t io n .
1 . M o b ility  o f  a n e g lib ib le  number o f a c to r s  i s  in d iv id u a l  
m o b ility .
EXAMPLE 10.3» Z etterberg  found th a t one m otive for  tak ing cou rses  
in  Columbia U n iv e r s ity 's  School o f  General S tu d ies  was th a t a few 
w e ll- to -d o  suburban matrons had not completed a c o l le g e  degree and 
were etabarassed when asked by fr ie n d s  o f  th e ir  husbands'; ,,What 
sch oo l did you graduate from?" In order not to  have to  respond 
w ith  th e ir  h igh sch oo l they en r o lle d  in  an ׳’adu lt"  c o l le g e  where 
they completed a B.A. (Z etterb erg , 19 )»
2 ־ M o b ility  o f  a large  number o f a c to r s  on a g iven  rank zv, 
i s  stratum  m o b ility .
EXAMPLE 1 0 .4 . M o b ility  was the p r in c ip a l in t e r e s t  o f  the 18th  
century French b o u r g e o is ie . As there were many b o u rg eo is ie  buying 
th e ir  way out o f  the c l a s s ,  we can speak o f  m o b ility  o f  a whole 
stratum .
3« M ob ility  o f  a s t a t u s ,  c o l l e c t i v e ,  or a c t io n  i s  r e - 
e v a lu a t io n .
EXAMPLE 10»5» The way the rank o f the s ta tu s  d octor ha3 increased  
from the 19th to  the 20th century i s  one i l lu s t r a t io n .  Had the 
French b o u rg eo is ie  devoted them selves to  improving the p r e s t ig e  o f  
the merchant In stead  o f  lea v in g  the s t a t u s ,  they would have been 
another i l l u s t r a t io n .
Further examples are probably superfluous«  But i t  i s  worth remarking 
th at m o b ility  o f  a s t a t u s ,  i f  there are many occupants o f  the s t a t u s ,  i s
a ls o  stratum  m o b ility .
The argument lead ing  to  1 0 3 ־ and 1 0 4 ״ socewhat c a su a lly  assumed 
th at m o b ility  i s  more l ik e ly  than rev o lu tio n a ry  change in  the rank
7
s tr u c tu r e ־ Like Banoit-Sraullyan we exp ect e x p lo s iv e  consequences to  
fo llo w  from imbalance on ly  i f  m o b ility  i s  "blocked״״ How i s  m o b ility  
blocked? Ego may be too  o ld  to  exp ect to  change ranks. Or the rank that 
must be changed may be an a scr ib ed  rank. Or the op p ortu n ity  s tru ctu re  
o f  S may be l im ite d . Or the rank might be one, l ik e  r e l ig io u s  denom ination  
or n a tio n a l o r ig in , to  which a c to r s  are so  sen tim en ta lly  a ttach ed  th a t ,  
even were i t  p o ss ib le  to  "pass*' for  someone o f  h igh er rank, ego might 
not want to  convert or a s s im ila t e .  Or, very im portant, a l t e r  may be 
w il l in g  and ab le  to  prevent ego from changing h is  ranks.
1 0 .7 . D e f in it io n . M o b ility  o f  an elem ent o f  S i s  b locked i f  e i th e r  
a c to r s  do not want or exp ect to  be m obile or o th ers  can and 
do a c t  to  prevent them from being m ob ile .
1 0 .8 . A ssum ption. I f  comparisons remain im balancing, m o b ility  
occurs u n less  b lock ed .
B locking i s  so  d efin ed  th at so  long as ego ex p ects  to  be m ob ile , 
whether a c tu a lly  m obile a t  a g iven  time or n o t , he w i l l  not become as  
upset a s  h is  itt&a lance a t  the moment would lead one to  p r e d ic t ־ A 
co lleg e -ed u ca ted  w hite c o l la r  worker who, comparing h im se lf  w ith  a h igh -  
sch oo l educated blue c o l la r  w orker, f in d s  he does not make as much as  
he sh ou ld 9 may not g e t very upset i f  he i s  s t i l l  very  young and exp ects  
to  make much more in  a few y e a r s . Only i f  he ex p ects  imbalance to  be
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a r e la t iv e ly ־ permanent s ta te  i s  he l ik e ly  to  f e e l  i t s  in ju s t ic e «  Thus,
10«9« The le s s  permanent an imbalance i s  seen  to  b e , the le s s  
m o b ility  i s  b locked .
But suppose m o b ility  were b lock ed ״״must the r e s u lt  be revo lu tion ?  
R evolution  i s  a very com plicated  id e a , probably in v o lv in g  a t  le a s t :
1) an organized movement; 2) a r a d ic a l change; 3) a c o n f l i c t .  These three  
are p a r tly  independent, in  the sense th a t o rg a n iza tio n  need not imply 
ra d ic a l change or c o n f l i c t ,  c o n f l i c t  need not always imply r a d ic a l change, 
and so  on» Therefore we cannot d ea l w ith  th e q u estio n  o f  r ev o lu tio n  i t ­
s e l f«  But i f  we ask how b lock in g  i s  r e la te d  to  o r g a n iz a tio n , change, and 
c o n f l i c t  each in  turn we can shot׳; on ly  th a t i t  i s  a n ecessary  c o n d it io n , 
not th a t i t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t .
O rganization  i t s e l f  i s  e com plicated  m atter , m ostly  in v o lv in g  fa c to r s  
independent o f  the theory  o f  rank b a la n ce . That i s ,  in  order to  adequately  
account fo r  o rg a n iza tio n  o f  a movemant we would have to  add assum ptions 
to  our theory (ab ou t, sa y , eco lo g y  and communication) th a t are independent 
o f  the assum ptions we have made so fa r .  Here we do not pretend to  be e x ­
h a u stiv e . We want to  add as few new assum ptions as p o s s ib le ,  m ostly  
drawing the im p lica tio n s  about o rg a n iza tio n  th a t are in h eren t in  assum ptions 
we have a lread y  made.
Not th at the q u estio n  o f  o rg a n iza tio n  i s  unim portant, because i t  
i s  probably r e la te d  not on ly  to  the rev o lu tio n a ry  consequences o f  im­
balance but a ls o  to  i t s  a c t iv a t in g  con d ition s«  Once o rg a n iza tio n  e x i s t s
!}
i t  may a c t iv a te  many persons who were is o la t e d  or in s u la te d , g iv e  them
s o c ia l  support, make th e ir  in ju s t ic e  more r e a l ,  r e in fo r c e  the impulse
to  a c t io n , and make them f e e l  more p ow erfu l. Probably, th e r e fo r e ,
o rg a n isa tio n  has a snowball e f f e c t ,  im plying chat p u b lic  ex p ress io n  o f
d isco n ten t i s  a th resh o ld  phenomenon. And once i t  gath ers momentum i t
can be expected  to  have a ra p id ly  d evelop ing  1'ta k e -o ff"  p er io d .
Before a sk in g  about the form ation o f  a new movement, i t  must f i r s t
be observed th a t i t  i s  a ls o  p o s s ib le ,  even probab le, th a t an e x is t in g
o rg a n isa tio n  be transform ed to  new purposes.
EXAMPLE 1 0 .6 . Many in te r p r e ta t io n s  o f  the Nazi movement make i t  
a party  appealing  p a r t ic u la r ly  to  the d isp la ced  middle c la s s e s  
(ruined by d ep ression  and i n f l a t i o n ) « But o f  course i t  was e a r l ie r  
an a n t i-b o u r g e o is , a n ti-e s ta b lish m e n t p a rty , a s w e ll  a s anti-W eim ar.
Whether an e x is t in g  party becomes transform ed seems to  depend on a t
le a s t  two c o n d itio n s: e i th e r  the e x is te n c e  o f  a "mass appeal" p a rty ,
l ik e  the Nazi p arty , which would g r a v ita te  to  any pool of d isc o n te n t;
or the e x is te n c e  o f  a s in g le - s ta tu s  a s s o c ia t io n  (such as an e th n ic  club
or occu p ation a l a s s o c ia t io n )  many members o f  whom come to  share a common
im balance. In both c a s e s ,  what appears to  be re lev a n t i s  th at imbalance
be a shared exp erien ce o f  a whole stratum . The same fa c to r  seems most
re lev a n t to  the form ation o f  a new o r g a n isa t io n . I t  seems rea so n a b le ,
th e r e fo r e , to  assume:
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1 0 .1 0 . Assum ption. A blocked stratum  has g rea te r  ten d en cies to  
organ ise  as a movement than blocked in d iv id u a ls .
־3 0״
But in  th a t case b lock in g  a lone i s  not s u f f i c ie n t  to  produce o r g a n iz a tio n ״
I f  not s u f f i c ie n t s  however, i t  appears to  be n ecessa ry , because
I..
1 0 .1 1 ״ The more members o f  an imbalanced stratum  th at exp ect to
be m obile out o f  the stratum , the le s s  the tendency o f  the  
stratum  to  become organ ized .
which seems a reasonable in fere n c e  from 10 .6  and 7 .
I t  i s  im portant to  see  th a t b lock in g  o f  in d iv id u a l m o b ility  i s  not
the same a s  b lock in g  o f  stratum  m o b ility . That unorganised in d iv id u a ls
are blocked does not mean th a t ,  when org a n ised , they are a ls o  b locked as
a stratum . I t  i s  p e r fe c t ly  p o ss ib le  th a t th e ir  in creased  power makes
m o b ility  o f  the whole group p o ss ib le  where m o b ility  as in d iv id u a ls  was
n o t . Hence i t  i s  p o ss ib le  to  have blocked in d iv id u a ls  o r g a n ise , not for
change or c o n f l i c t ,  but fo r  m o b ility .
EXAMPLE 1 0 .7 i E arly unions were o fte n  formed by tr a d it io n a l  c r a f t s  
r e s i s t in g  p r o le ta r is a t io n .  In the U nited S ta te s  th e ir  in t e r e s t s  
were e a r ly  con fin ed  to  in cr ea sin g  wages and job s e c u r ity ,  w ith  
l i t t l e  d es ire  fo r  major s o c ia l  changes or p o l i t i c a l  r e v o lu tio n .
The impulse to  change i s  not l e s s  com plicated  than the q u estion  o f  
o r g a n isa t io n , and i t  does not help  th a t the d e f in i t io n  o f  " ra d ica l change" 
i s  so much more d i f f i c u l t »  For a theory o f  rank balance we s h a l l  mean 
by r a d ic a l change a r e d e f in it io n  o f  the system  o f  s t r a t i f i c a t io n  in  S ״
A r e d e f in it io n  i s  a change in  the importance o f  the c r i t e r ia  th a t de­
termine e v a lu a t io n , or in  other words
10.12« D e f in it io n ״ R e d e fin it io n  i s  a response to  imbalance in  
which the w eight v ec to r  W i s  changed־
EXAMPLE 1 0 8 ־. A poor son o f  an o ld  Mayflower fam ily  l i v e s  in  a 
low -rent d i s t r i c t  o f  B oston . His neighbors g e n e r a lly  regard in ״ 
come as the most im portant determ inant o f  rank, but he h im se lf  
em phasizes the importance o f  lin ea g e  and regards income a s  i r ­
r e le v a n t .
The d e s ir e  to  change the rank stru ctu re  o f  S has o fte n  been thought 
a
o f  a s /r a d ic a l  l e f t i s t  a t t i t u d e .  L en sk i, fo r  example (1954)* has supposed 
th a t in c o n s is te n ts  tend to  be l e f t i s t  in  th e ir  socio-econom ic a t t i t u d e s .
Of course^ L ip se t has supposed th a t they tend to  be r a d ic a lly  r ig h t  in  
th e ir  c i v i l  l i b e r t i e s  a t t i tu d e s  (195 ) ,  but th is  does not co n tra d ic t  
L ensk i, s in ce  the two a t t itu d e s  c o r r e la te  r e la t iv e ly  p o o r ly . The l e f t -  
r ig h t  d is t in c t io n s  p a r t ic u la r ly  where i t  i s  presumed to  be the same as  
a Dem ocratic״Republican d is t in c t io n ,  i s  probably a bad one fo r  our pur­
p o ses , but the q u estio n  o f  what d ir e c t io n  r a d ic a l change i s  to  take i s  
c e r ta in ly  a m eaningful one. I t  i s  a ls o  a com plicated  one, because an in ­
c o n s is te n t  c le a r ly  can corns to  be o f  the r ig h t  in  two very  d is s im ila r  w ays. 
One r e s u lt s  from a d e s ir e  fo r  r a d ic a l change th a t fa c e s  a d e c lin in g  e l i t e ״ 
This process i s ,  roughly: an upper stratum  b eg in s to  d e c lin e  e i th e r  b e­
cause a r i s in g  e l i t e  d is p la c e s  i t  or s o c ie t y  changes in  such a way th at  
the stratum  lo s e s  former ground, and some members o f  the o ld er  e l i t e  pro­
t e s t  i t s  lo s s  both by defend ing the importance o f  i t s  v e s t ig e s  o f  rank— 
say lin ea g e  and e t h n ic i t y —and by a tta ck in g  the fo rces  which they hold
resp o n sib le  for  th e ir  d e c l in e - - s a y  new e l i t e s  or the p o l i t i c s  of th e New 
Deal and i t s  su c c e s so r s , in c lu d in g  moderate R epublicanism ־ This then
leads to  attem pts a t  r e d e f in i t io n  o f  the rank stru ctu re  in  a r ig h t  
("reactionary" ) rather than l e f t  d ir e c t io n ,a n d  to  h o s t i le  a g g ress iv e  a t ­
tack  on " forces o f  change". Thus we have the fo llo w in g  c la s s i f i c a t io n :
1 0 .1 3 . C la s s i f i c a t io n . 1 . A r e d e f in it io n  i s  a r ig h t-w in g  p r o te s t  
i f  i t  a ttem pts to  in crea se  the importance o f  an o ld ,  e s ta b ­
lish e d  h igher rank and decrease the importance o f  a new 
rank which i t  se e s  as d isp la c in g  i t .
2 .  A ran k -p ro tast i s  a le ft-w ir tg  p r o te s t  
i f  i t  attem pts to  decrease the importance o f  an o ld ,  e s ta b ­
lish e d  rank which i t  s e e s  as b lock in g  m o b ili ty ,  and attem pts  
to  in crea se  the importance o f  a new rank w ith  re sp ec t to  
which i t s  members have been r e la t iv e ly  r e c e n t ly  r i s in g .
But what looks l ik e  a r a d ic a l-r ig h t  p r o te s t  may a ls o  resu lt¿  not from a 
d e s ir e  fo r  r a d ic a l change, but from m o b ility . This process i s ,  roughly:
Ego i s  upwardly m ob ile , t r i e s  to  a s s o c ia te  w ith  members o f  the c la s s  in ­
to  which he has r i s e n ,  i s  reb u ffed , or th in k s he i s  reb u ffed , b e lie v e s  
th is  i s  due to  h is  sp eech , c lo th e s ,  a t t i t u d e s ,  and o th er  s ig n s  o f  h is  
lower ranks, and th erefo re  t r i e s  to  change in  th ese  r e s p e c t s .  This then  
leads to  s t r i c t  conform ity or even overconform ity  w ith  the b e l i e f s  and 
va lu es o f  the upper stratum , a symptom o f  which may be an u ltr a -c o n se r v a tiv e  
p o l i t i c a l  p o s it io n .  A Goldwater Republican i s  produced.
Because they want to  rad efin e  W in  co n tra d ic to ry  ways c o n f l i c t  o f  
l e f t  and r ig h t  looks in e v ita b le «  In fa c t  i t  i s  to  the pressure for  
r a d ic a l change th a t one o fte n  a t tr ib u te s  the c o n f l i c t  th a t supposedly r e ­
s u l t s  from b lo ck in g . But does r a d ic a l  change n e c e s s a r ily  crea te  c o n f l ic t?
I f  ego wants to  compel o th ers to  red efin e  W iu  the same way a s  he 
h im se lf  d e fin e s  i t ,  change must crea te  c o n f l i c t .  What i s  problem atic i s
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whether he wants to  compel the consent o f  o thers«  I f  there i s  c o n f l i c t  
i t  must be both because ego can change S in  no way th a t does not in vo lve  
fo r c e fu l com pulsion and because a l t e r  r e s i s t s  change. What we w i l l  show 
f i r s t  i s  th at some a l t e r s  in v a r ia b ly  r e s i s t  r e d e f in i t io n .
From 10.3 i t  fo llo w s th a t i f  ego changes W what he w i l l  do i s  d e­
crease the Importance o f  h is  lower rank.
1 0 .1 4 . Given: r.. and r . are noncontingent ranks, r^ i s  l e s s  than 
r . ,  and ego make¿ some form o f  change in  W־ Then ego pre­
fe r s  to  decrease w. and in crea se  w . .
~J
I f ,  th e r e fo r e , most o th ers do consent to  r e d e f in i t io n ,  some p rev io u sly  
w e ll-e s ta b lis h e d  a c to r s  in  S_are suddenly d isp la c e d . I f  ego i s  im balanced, 
so  i s  any a l t e r  who compares h im se lf  w ith  ego (9 « 1 ) , but some o f  these  
a lt e r s  are p a r t ic u la r ly  a f fe c te d  because th e ir  irobalance i s  the converse  
o f  e g o 's ;  th a t i s ,  i f  fo r  ego r ^  r^ , fo r  a l t e r  r \  „ For th ese
a l t e r s  particu larly^  i f  w. i s  decreased  th e ir  o v e r a ll  ev a lu a tio n  i s  de­
crea sed , and th e ir  own r e d e f in it io n  o f  W i s  p r e c is e ly  the op p o site  o f  
eg o 's»  So some a l t e r s w i l l  always r e s i s t  change.
Because i t  i s  so  g e n e r a lly  Important to  the q u estio n  o f  c o n f l i c t  in  
t h is  p a r tic u la r  kind o f  s i tu a t io n  d eserves c a r e fu l d e f in i t io n .  A lte r  
r e s i s t s  change whenever there i s  a p a r tic u la r  kind o f  con tin gen t r e la t io n  
(as used in  10 . 2) between h is  ranks and eg o 's .w h ich  can be c a l le d  a
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zero-sum r e la t io n .
1 0 .1 5 .1 . D e f in it io n . A 0-sum co n tin gen t rank r^ i s  a rank such 
th at ego cannot in crea se  the value o f  h is  own rank on 
r . w ithout a corresponding decrease o f  a l t e r ' s  value on 
r . .־־!
EXAMPLE 1 0 .8 . R ussian Jews are an e th n ic  group o f  r e la t iv e ly  low 
rank in  S3. As sorae o f  them acquire w ealth  they move out o f  neighbor­
hood s } which has rath er low e v a lu a tio n  in  S_, in to  neighborhood jt, 
occupied by old-Americans and w ith  rath er h igh e v a lu a tio n  in  !3. U sually  
the e f f e c t  i s  to  d ep rec ia te  the value o f  t ,  in c r e a s in g ly  so  as more 
Russian Jews in vad e. E ven tu a lly  the newcomers succeed to  occupancy 
as the old-Am ericans f le e  to  new neighborhoods.
S ince the value o f a neighborhood as a s ig n  o f  rank depends on the ev a lu a tio n  
o f  the e th n ic  group which l iv e s  in  i t ,  a lower group cannot e a s i ly  in crease  
i t s  own " r e s id e n tia l"  rank w ithout d ep rec ia tin g  th at o f the o ld er  occupants 
o f neighborhoods in to  which they move. I t  i s  l ik e ly  th erefo re  th a t a l t e r  
w i l l  in  some way r e s i s t  the change in  h is  own rank. P a r t ic u la r ly  so s in ce  
he has moved from a balanced to  an imbalanced s t a t e .
1 0 .1 5 .2 . Assum ption. A lte r  w i l l  r e s i s t  any 0-sum con tin g en t change 
in  rank by eg o .
Returning to  the main l in e  o f  argument, what we have so  fa r  concluded  
i s  th a t
1 0 .1 6 . Every converse imbalanced a c to r  i s  deprived o f  rank by a 
change in  W.
10.17» For every  imbalance in  S there i s  a converse im balance. 
T herefore,
1 0 .1 8 . Every r e d e f in it io n  o f W to  which a l l  a c to r s  in  S consent 
i s  an 0 ־ sum co n tin gen t change fo r  some a c to r s  in  S..
Hence we ought to  be ab le  to  conclude th a t c o n f l i c t  i s  in e v i ta b le .  For 
from 1 0 .1 5 , we have th a t a l t e r  w i l l  r e s i s t  the change. But what tie a c tu a lly  
have i s  on ly  th a t c o n f l i c t  i s  in e v ita b le  I f  ego compels the a s se n t  o f  
o th ers; we must s t i l l  dem onstrate th at th is  i s  e g o 's  on ly  way o f  changing  
W, which cannot be dem onstrated.
As he could have a t  any e a r l ie r  s tep  in  the balance p r o c e ss , again  
ego could  r e t r e a t .  We have s t ip u la te d  th a t we w i l l  co n sid er  what happens 
given  th a t he does n o t, but r e tr e a t  a t  t h is  sta g e  o f  the p rocess i s  a new 
v a r ia n t o f  r e tr e a t  as d efin ed  in  10 . 1 , and i s  worth sep arate  a t t e n t io n .
I f  a t  t h is  p o in t ego i s o la t e s  h im se lf  from o th ers  he makes h is  new d e f i ­
n it io n  o f  W an a lto g e th e r  p r iv a te  r e a c t io n , but s t i l l  he has made a r a d ic a l 
change ( in  h is  own view ) o f  s t r a t i f i c a t io n  in  S ince e v a lu a tio n s  are 
so  p e c u lia r ly  dependent on h0w the p u b lic  grants ones c la im s , however* 
ego may want to  ob ta in  consent from a t  l e a s t  some o th e r s . D esp ite•ou r
previous l in e  o f  argument i t  s t i l l  does not fo llow  th a t c o n f l i c t  occurs 
because ego might o b ta in  consent from ju s t  th ose  who have som ething to
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ga in  and noth ing to  lo s e ,  and so  long as t h is  group in s u la te s  i t s e l f  i t  
i s  not brought in to  c o n f l i c t  w ith  th ose o th ers  who have something to  lo se  
and noth ing to  g a in . What • r e s u l t s ,  in  f a c t ,  i s  probably two su b c u ltu r es , 
w ith  opposed r e d e f in it io n s  o f  W but com pletely  in su la te d  from each o th e r . 
I f  they can remain in su la te d  there w i l l  be no c o n f l ic t»  There w i l l  be 
c o n f l i c t  on ly  i f  they are forced  in to  c o n ta c t , or i f  e i th e r  compels con­
sen t from some m eaningful audience whose ev a lu a tio n s  are im portant to  
the o th er .
EXAMPLE 1 0 .9 . A ,,s o c ia l  r e g is te r "  i s  a w ell-know n way for  persons 
o f  o ld  lin e a g e  and o ld  w ealth  to  p ro tec t them selves from the in ­
tru sio n  o f  nouveaux a r r i v l s ,  fo r  whom w ealth  I s  more important as  
a determ inant o f  rank than i t  i s  fo r  the e s ta b lis h e d  l in e a g e s .
Very o fte n  the s o c ia l  r e g is t e r  i s  not o n ly  a bar to  encrance o f  
the newcomer, i t  i s  a ls o  a r e la t iv e ly  In su la ted  su b cu ltu re . I t  
i s  p rotected  from the importance o f  w ea lth  in  the la rg er  s o c ie ty  
by the fa c t  th a t i t  serv es  to  co n fin e  in te r a c t io n  so narrowly and 
because i t  c a r r ie s  an id eo lo g y  th a t d en ies the im portance  o f  the  
d e f in it io n s  o f  a la r g er  a u d ien ce .
Because r e d e f in it io n  has consequences o ther than c o n f l i c t  i t  cannot
be sa id  th a t b lock in g  must produce c o n f l i c t .  On the o th er  hand, i t  can
be sa id  th a t c o n f l i c t ,  even c o n f l i c t  due to  b lo c k in g , can be created  in
other w ays־ In f a c t ,  in  gen era l
1 0 .1 9 , Any 0-sum change th a t does not r e s u lt  in  w ithdrawal r e s u lt s  
in  c o n f l i c t .
Simply to  i l l u s t r a t e ,  one im portant case  i s  th a t in  which a m obile stratum  
attem pts to  capture p e r q u is ite s  or p o s it io n s  from another stratum  which, 
because there are not enough p la ces  to  s a t i s f y  b o th , i s  d isp la ced  in  the 
p ro cess . Such a process may be c a l le d  r e d is tr ib u t io n .
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1 0 .2 0 . D e f in it io n . A r e d is tr ib u t io n  o f  r  ^ occurs when a p o s it io n  
a t  a g iven  value o f  th a t was h eld  by u  ^ corns to  be held
in stea d  by u^.
Probably r e d is tr ib u t io n  occurs when a whole stratum  i s  m obile but rank 
i s  s c a r c e . So s o c ia l  stru ctu ra  i s  l ik e ly  to  be u p set i f  j u s t  a few in d i­
v id u a ls  in crea se  rank, even i f  rank i s  s c a r c e . No s o c ia l  stru ctu re  i s  
l ik e ly  to  be upset even i f  many in d iv id u a ls  in crea se  rank, so  long as the 
number o f  ranks i s  expanding.
1 0 .2 1 . Let T be the t o t a l  number o f  p o s it io n s  a t  a g iven  le v e l  o f
r , and l e t  the stratum  w hold most or a l l  o f  such p o s it io n s .  
U nless stratum  V i s  sm aller  than the number o f  ex ce ss  p o s it io n s ,  
members o f  v cannot occupy p o s it io n s  a t  th a t le v e l  u n less  
£ s i s  r e d is tr ib u te d .
J3o co n c lu s io n  could be more ob v io u s, but the i l lu s t r a t io n  i s  never­
th e le s s  a good one. S ince r e d is tr ib u t io n  i s  an 0-sum change, u n le ss  a 
r is in g  stratum  fin d s  some o th er path to  balance c o n f l i c t  must occu r.
1 0 .2 2 . A ssum ption; I f  r.. remains a 'd i f f e r e n t ia l l y  eva luated
c h a r a c te r is t ic ,  stratum  m o b ility  w i l l  lead  to c o n f l i c t  in  
d ir e c t  proportion  to  the e x te .it  th a t the h igher stratum  g e ts  
d isp o ssessed  when the lower stratum  moves up.
